Blame the system, not a greedy Trent Lott -- Providence Journal

Lee Drutman: Blame the system, not a greedy Trent Lott
01:00 AM EST on Monday, December 10, 2007
LEE DRUTMAN
WASHINGTON

SO, TRENT LOTT, the Mississippi senator who had served as the Republican majority leader, has decided he no longer wants to be an elected official. Barely a year into his fourth term, he announced last month he is retiring with no definite plans. But everybody in Washington pretty much knows that he is going to become a lobbyist.

And why not? Instead of the measly $165,200 he earns now to represent the good people of Mississippi, he can earn probably 10 times that by representing the private interests that are capable of paying him some ridiculously high fee, though one that just may actually be worth it, given Mr. Lott’s relationships and skills as a political tactician.

The obvious response is to criticize Senator Lott for his greed (this is certainly the modal response in the news media). But it’s not as though Lott has been some brilliant champion of the people who is suddenly selling out to the almighty dollar. If he is going to serve wealthy special interests (as he often has during his legislative career), he might as well get better compensated for it.

To Senator Lott’s credit, he has spent 34 years in public service, which is a very long career. During this time, he has watched many of his colleagues retire and then go make millions in private lobbying. He is 66, and being a senator is an exhausting job. He has a large family to provide for. Leaving mid-term is actually a pretty rational decision.

What’s truly remarkable is that more congressmen and senators don’t do it. Sure, plenty of former senators and representatives have gone on to become lobbyists upon retiring. According to Public Citizen, since 1998, 43 percent of retiring lawmakers subsequently registered to lobby (and some in quite outrageous ways, such as Louisiana Congressman Billy Tauzin (D), who became head of PhRMA , the drug companies’ lobbying organization, after helping to shepherd the pharmaceutical gift basket better known as the Medicare Prescription Drug Act through Congress). But Lott is the first to resign mid-term to do it (and also the first U.S. senator to resign with no definite announced plans and no major scandal).

So why is the money so good? Maybe because every year, there are more and more companies, universities, foreign governments and other high-paying clients active in Washington. Ten years ago, you could still find some major companies without any real D.C. presence. Now you can’t. And as lobbying becomes more competitive, somebody as savvy and super-connected as a Trent Lott becomes that much more valuable.

Which is a tremendous problem. In an ideal pluralist democracy, lots of groups would petition their government for redress of grievances (as guaranteed by the First Amendment), and in doing so, would ensure that a wide spectrum of interests are represented in the policy-making process. But what if only a handful of those groups can afford to pay for super-connected people like Trent Lott? As the costs of the most connected lobbyists continue to escalate, the representation divide between the haves and have-nots grows worse.

Meanwhile, what’s happening at the lawmaker level is much worse at the staffer level. It is now increasingly common practice in Washington for a young staffer to spend a few years on the Hill, develop some expertise and build some connections, and then go make three times the salary as a lobbyist (and again — why not!? Better money, better hours, and the chance to finally take credit for your own work). But the consequence is that Congress has an increasingly difficult time building its own expertise. As soon as a staffer develops some substantial knowledge about some policy area, he or she is off to make more money in the service of someone with far more parochial use for that knowledge.

The challenge then is two-fold. One is to figure out ways to make public service more of a career in itself and less of the stepping-stone it is increasingly becoming. This may mean such things as better salaries, better benefits and better hours. The other challenge is to find a way that more groups can get adequate representation in Washington, not just those who can afford to hire the megaphone of an über-connected Trent Lott type. This is much harder.

Perhaps it is time to think about regulating the prices that lobbyists can charge for their services (ideally to achieve some rough parity with government). Doing so would not only provide a more level playing field for different outside groups. It would also help to depress the salaries of lobbyists, and thus reduce the lure of lobbying to public servants. This is, of course, a radical solution. But perhaps drastic times call for drastic measures.

Lee Drutman, a frequent contributor, is the co-author of The People’s Business: Controlling Corporations and Restoring Democracy.

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